This chapter analyzes the dilemma that Swiss citizens face between the reintroduction of some form of immigration control and the continuation of the bilateral agreements with the European Union (EU). More specifically, the purpose of the chapter is to shed light on the sociodemographic and political characteristics of the pivotal group of voters who supported the initiative against mass immigration in 2014 but, when asked about the dilemma, say they would give priority to the continuation of the bilateral agreements over immigration control. To that end, I pool data from three different opinion surveys conducted in 2014, 2015 and 2016 and I estimate logistic regression models. The results highlight the importance of age, trust in government, left-right orientation, support to Swiss traditions and political interest as determinants of individual attitudes towards bilateral treaties and immigration control.
Introduction
Next to contributing to the literature on Swiss politics through his main research topics (work and welfare, social policy, neo-corporatism and European integration), Klaus Armingeon also shed some fresh light on the Swiss party system and political attitudes of Swiss citizens. In the first collective volume published in the context of the Swiss electoral studies (Selects) (Kriesi 1998) , he questioned the conventional wisdom that there was no national party system in Switzerland (Armingeon 1998 , see also Armingeon 2003) . In the aftermath of the popular rejection of the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992, he analyzed survey data to demonstrate that political and identity-related considerations outweighed utilitarian factors in the explanation of individual preferences on European integration, thus denying the claim of economists about the superiority of interest-based factors (Armingeon 2000) . More recently, he conducted an experimental survey to delve into the dilemma that Swiss citizens face between the implementation of the initiative against mass immigration accepted on February 9, 2014or some other form of immigration controland the continuation of bilateral agreements with the EU (Armingeon and Lutz 2015) . That dilemma is not only one of the most crucial political issues in contemporary Switzerland. It also speaks to the broader topic of the present volume, i.e. the Euro-crisis and related consequences for the European social model.
As a result of the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on the free movement of persons between Switzerland the EU, the inflow of migrant workers from EU member states has increased since the mid-2000s. The economic crisis prompted by the international financial turmoil in the early 2010s has further reinforced that trend. While most EU countries were severely hit by the crisis, Switzerland has remained largely unaffected and has, therefore, become a highly attractive place for European workers. This, together with the xenophobic discourse of the Swiss People's party, a national-conservative but governing party, has exacerbated anti-immigration feelings among the Swiss public.
In this chapter, I take over the analysis of Swiss citizens' attitudes towards the dilemma between immigration control and bilateral agreements. In a study I co-authored with Simon Lanz and Alessandro Nai (Sciarini et al. 2015) , we drew attention to a specific group of voters with somehow ambivalent attitudes. According to survey measures, those voters supported the initiative against mass immigration. Yet when asked about the dilemma they say they would give priority to the continuation of the bilateral agreements over immigration control. This group of voters is obviously crucial, since it will make the difference in avery likelyfuture direct democratic vote. The purpose of this chapter is to delve deeper into the sociodemographic and politial characteristics of that group of pivotal voters. To that end, I pool data from three different surveys conducted in 2014, 2015 and 2016, and I estimate logistic regression models accounting for citizens' choice between immigration control and bilateral treaties, conditioned on their vote on the initiative against mass immigration. 1
Background information
Switzerland is not a member of the European Union, yet there have been more direct democratic votes on European integration in Switzerland than in any EU member state. After the rejection of the EEA in 1992, the Federal Council enjoyed consistent support for its strategy of bilateral agreements with the EU, winning eight direct democratic votes in a row between 1997 and 2009 (Sciarini 2017) . However, the Swiss government suffered a major defeat on February 9, 2014.
On that day, a narrow majority of the Swiss people (50.3%) but a large majority of cantons (14.5 of 23 cantonal votes) backed the popular initiative "Stop mass immigration" sponsored by the Swiss People's Party.
The initiative "Stop mass immigration" contradicted the bilateral agreement with the EU on the free movement of persons, since it aimed to reintroduce control over immigration through quotas on foreign workers and a preference for national workers in the labour market. It also demanded the Swiss government renegotiate international commitments within three years, to put them in line with the initiative's requirements.
As a result of the so-called "guillotine clause" included in the first set of bilateral agreements concluded in 1998, the termination of the agreement on the free movement of persons would invalidate the other six agreements. 2 After the EU Commission refused Switzerland's repeated demand to renegotiate freedom of movement, the Swiss Parliament took the lead and opted for a (very) light implementation of the popular initiative. In autumn 2016, it passed a law that under certain conditions requires Swiss employers to inform Swiss job agencies about vacancies before hiring a non-Swiss, but does not limit the free movement of EU workers to Switzerland. Deeply dissatisfied with this outcome, the Swiss People's Party responded with the launch of a new popular initiative, this time explicitly targeting the agreement on the free movement of persons. In one or two years Swiss citizens will thus again have to vote, and to choose between more control over immigration or the continuation of the strategy of smooth, bilateral integration in the EU.
Citizens' attitudes towards bilateral treaties and immigration control 3.1 Descriptive statistics
According to a poll carried out in the aftermath of the 2014 vote, the vast majority of voters who supported the "Stop mass immigration" initiative were ready to risk the termination of the bilateral agreements if that was the price to pay to control immigration (Sciarini, Nai, and Tresch 2014) . 3 Yet there is obviously a difference between being ready to take the risk of termination and being ready to endorse termination. In fact, according to the same survey a majority of Yes voters did not agree that the initiative contradicted the agreement on the free movement of persons and threatened the bilateral agreements. Had they anticipated the intransigence of the EU, perhaps they would have seen the issue differently. Data from three surveys conducted in December 2014, Spring 2015 and March 2016 help provide a closer look at how Swiss citizens regard the dilemma between immigration control 2 Given the EEA experience, the EU wanted to protect itself against a possible new popular rejection that would hurt the overall balance of concessions. Already during the bilateral negotiations the EU insisted on the 'parallelism of the talks', i.e. that any agreement on a given topic was dependent on the acceptance of an agreement in the other issue areas Sciarini 2001, 2007) . The "guillotine clause" followed the same logic. If one agreement was rejected by the Swiss, then the whole package would fall. and bilateral agreements. 4 In those surveys, respondents were first reminded of the Federal Council's attempt to implement the initiative against mass immigration and, in parallel, to maintain the bilateral agreements concluded with the EU. Then respondents were asked which goal was most important to them, in case it was impossible to reach boththe continuation of the bilateral strategy or the control over immigration? 5 Note: Data is weighted according to the outcome of the vote on the initiative against mass immigration.
The last column of table 1 presents the results for both respondents who voted on the initiative against massive immigration, and those who did not or could not vote (don't know and no answer are excluded). The results show a clear preference for the bilateral treaties: In the pooled data-set 57% of respondents favor the continuation of the bilateral treaties with the EU, and 34% favor limiting immigration. These figures are fairly stable across surveys: Support to the bilateral treaties amounts to 55% in the 2014 (VOX) survey, to 53% in the 2015 (MosaiCH) survey and to 61% in the 2016 (VOX) survey. More recent surveys yielded similar results.
In addition to this prospective question the surveys also included a retrospective question asking respondents whether they voted Yes or No on the "Stop mass immigration" initiative.
Unsurprisingly, preferences regarding the bilateral treaties versus immigration control vary heavily depending on respondents' vote on the initiative against mass immigration. On the one hand, voters who rejected the initiative almost unanimously favor the continuation of the bilateral treaties (87%). On the other hand, about 60% of voters who accepted the initiative also give priority to limiting immigration. These are the two hardliners groups of ardent supporters of bilateral agreements and ardent supporters of immigration control, respectively.
Yet the group of respondents who supported the initiative against mass immigration is not completely homogeneous. A sizeable share (about a third) of voters who said Yes to the initiative nevertheless give priority to the continuation of the bilateral agreements. This group accounts for the overall preference for bilateral agreements over immigration control, and will obviously play a decisive role when the new popular initiative of the Swiss people's party will be put to the ballot. Again, a closer look at the data shows that this group is of about the same size in each survey, with a slight upward trend over time (29% in the 2014 survey, 31% in the 2015 survey and 36% in the 2016 survey). Finally, we see from table 1 that a relative majority of people who did not (or could not) vote on February 9, 2014 also favor the bilateral treaties (46%); 31% favor limiting immigration and 24% do not know or do not answer.
Analyses
I now turn to a more systematic analysis of Swiss citizens' attitudes, in order to shed light on the socio-demographic profile of citizens favoring immigration control and those favoring the continuation of the bilateral strategy of integration into the EU, respectively. To that end, I estimate binomial logistic regression models focusing on respondents who prefer either the continuation of the treaties or regaining control over immigration (table 2) . Positive coefficients indicate preference for the bilateral treaties over immigration control. The first model (M1) is a basic model with a set of socio-demographic and political variables. Support of the bilateral agreements increases significantly with age, political interest, trust in government and decreases the further right respondents self-locate on the left-right scale, or the more they support Swiss traditions. Highly educated people have a preference for bilateral treaties, whereas Italianspeaking people and respondents who see the economic situation as bad or very bad have a preference for immigration control. Finally, the preference for the bilateral treaties was slightly lower in the first, 2014 survey.
Left-right self-location has the strongest effect: The predicted probability to prefer the bilateral treaties over immigration control increases by 0.43 as one moves from the far right to the far left of the left-right scale. Trust in government comes next: Respondents who trust the federal Council have a 0.38 higher probability to favor the bilateral treaties than distrustful respondents. Value orientations regarding Swiss traditions also make a big difference: The predicted probability to prefer the bilateral treaties over immigration control decreases by 0.28 between respondents who least strongly and those who most strongly wish to protect Swiss traditions. The impact of the other variables is comparatively lower: Only 0.13 difference in predicted probability to prefer the bilateral treaties between the youngest (18 years) and the oldest (85) respondents, 0.14 between citizens with the lowest and the highest education, and 0.11 between the lowest and the highest political interest; finally, citizens who rate the economic situation as bad or very bad have a 0.16 lower probability to prefer the bilateral treaties than citizens who rate it as very good, good or medium.
In sum, according to the baseline model 1 citizens who trust the government and citizens with a leftist ideology or a weak attachment to Swiss traditions are typical supporters of bilateral agreements. Conversely, citizens who do not trust the Federal Council and citizens with rightist ideology or strong attachment to Swiss traditions are typical supporters of immigration control.
Additional tests, not reported here, show similar results if one disaggregates the analysis and estimates the model for each survey separately. In particular, trust in government, left-right orientation and support to Swiss traditions have the same strong effects in all three surveys. Some small differences are nevertheless worth mentioning: Age has a stronger impact on the dilemma between bilateral treaties and immigration control in the first andeven more soin the second survey than in the third, in which that effect is no longer significant. By contrast, the effect of political interest is strong and positive in the third survey, but is not significant in the other two surveys. (1) rather than support for immigration control (0). Data is weighted according to the outcome of the vote on the initiative against mass immigration. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
In model 2 I add the variable measuring whether respondents voted Yes or No the initiative against mass immigration. The number of observations gets smaller, owing to citizens who either did or could not vote, or did not answer the recall question, and are hence excluded from the analysis. 6 In line with the descriptive analysis above, respondents' vote on the iniative against mass immigration logically has a strong effect. Citizens who voted against the initiative have a 0.49 higher probability to prefer the bilateral treaties over immigration control, than citizens who voted in favor. The other coefficients remain largely unaffected by the inclusion of the retrospective questionand the effect of political interest even tends to get stronger. Finally, in model 3 I introduce interaction terms between the vote choice on the initiative against mass immigration and each independent variable. This helps to test if the profile of respondents who would give priority to the bilateral treaties rather than to limiting immigration is different between voters who said Yes and No to the initiative. More specifically, this helps to identify the socio-demographic and political characteristics of voters who supported the initiative, but would nevertheless prioritize the continuation of the bilateral agreements. According to Sciarini et al's (2015) study based on a single survey, three variables played a role in that respect: age, trust in government and political interest. To check whether other variables matter, I additionally introduce an interaction term between the vote on the "Stop mass immigraiton initiative" and all variables.
The results of table 1 confirm that age, trust in government and political interest have significant conditional effects. To better grasp these effects I rely on a graphical presentation of the predicted probabilities. Starting with age, figure 1 shows that among voters who rejected the initiative, support for the bilateral agreements does not vary across age: At any age, the predicted probability to favor the bilateral treaties exceeds 0.8. Among voters who supported the initiative, by contrast, age matters greatly, with old respondents being much more likely to favor the bilateral treaties, than young respondents. Between the youngest and the oldest age group the difference in predicted probability to favor the bilateral treaties over limiting immigration amounts to 0.34. Thus, if at some point they will be asked to choose between the continuation of the bilateral treaties and the control over immigration, citizens who supported the initiative against mass immigration are likely to provide a different response, depending on their age. Old voters are likely to make up their mind in favor of the bilateral agreements, whereas young initiative voters are likely to stick to their support to immigration control.
As we suggested elsewhere (Sciarini, Lanz, and Nai 2015) , a possible explanation for this result relates to citizens' experience with previous votes on the bilateral agreements. Younger voters, in particular those aged 18 to 30 have had less opportunities to decide in a popular vote on the relationships between Switzerland and the EU, than older voters. Moreover, when the Swiss people rejected the EEA in 1992, even voters who were about 40 at the time of the surveys were not eligible to vote yet. As a result, older voters are more experienced and perhaps more aware of the economic importance of the bilateral agreements, than young voters. This, together with the fact that turnout is far higher among old voters than among young voters, may work to the advantage of the pro-integration camp in the future vote. shows the effect of trust in government for voters who voted against the initiative, is significant and strong, and the coefficient of the interaction term is small and non-significant. On closer inspection, however, trust in government plays a much greater role among those who voted Yes to the initiative, than among those who voted No (table 3) : Among No voters the predicted probability to prefer the bilateral treaties is 0.13 higher if they trust the Federal Council, than if they do not trust it; among Yes voters the corresponding difference is twice as high (0.25). Political interest also plays a role, but in a different way ( figure 2) . The predicted probability to support the bilateral treaties increases with political interest among respondents who voted No to the initiative (by 0.19 between citizens least and most interested in politics), whereas among Yes voters political interest does not make a significant difference. This means that interested voters who voted against the initiative are (even) more likely than less interestd voters to stick to the vote they casted in 2014. Among citizens who accepted the initiative, by contrast, politically interested people do not show a higher willingness to confirm their support to immigration control, than uninterested people. 3) . Similarly, figure 4 shows that the predicted probability to prefer the bilateral treaties decreases the stronger one supports Swiss traditions, and this among both citizens who voted against the initiative and, even more so, among those who vote Yes (0.17 and 0.29 difference in predicted probability, respectively). Figure 3 : Predicted probabilities to prefer the bilateral treaties over immigration control by left-right self-location for voters that rejected or accepted the initiative against mass immigration Figure 4 : Predicted probabilities to prefer the bilateral treaties over immigration control by support for Swiss traditions for voters that rejected or accepted the initiative against mass immigration Finally, the effect of the variable measuring perceptions about the economic situation is also worth noting. That variable overall has a very weak influence on the choice between bilateral treaties and immigration control, with one exception: Among respondents who voted Yes to the initiative, those seeing the economic situation as bad or very bad have a very low probability to prefer the bilateral treaties (0.25). By contrast, among citizens who voted No to the initiative, those seeing the economic situation as bad do not differ from citizens with a more positive view of the economic situation. In other words, the negative attitudes against bilateral treaties of citizens with bad perceptions of the economic situation appearing in model 1 only holds for those who supported the initiative against mass immigration. This is presumably indicative of utilitarian attitudes among citizens with a pessimistic view on the economic situation and who feel especially threatened by migrant workers.
I again re-estimated model 3 for each of the three surveys separately (results not reported here). With regard to the conditional effects of the vote on the initiative against mass immigration, two differences with the results presented above deserve being mentioned. Firstly, the age effect among respondents who voted Yes to the initiative depicted in figure 1 is especially strong in the 2014 survey. It is lower in the 2016 survey and absent in the 2015 survey. Secondly, political interest shows contrasted patterns. In the 2016 survey, as in the pooled data-set, political interest has no effect on the choice between the bilateral treaties and immigration control among respondents who voted Yes to the initiative. Yet it has a negative effect in the 2014 survey and a positive effect in the 2015 survey. More work is needed to account for these contrasting results. By contrast, the results regarding trust in government, leftright self-location and value preferences regarding Swiss traditions are fairly similar across surveys.
In a last step, I estimated models additionally including respondents who did or could not vote on the initiative against mass immigration in addition to those who voted Yes or No (results not reported here). Among voters who did or could not vote on the initiative age, interest in politics and political values regarding traditions do not play any role. Self-location on the leftright scale has a similar effect as among those who accepted or rejected the initiative, i.e. support to the bilateral treaties decreases from left to right. Finally, and more interestingly, trust in government has a strong positive effect on support to the bilateral treaties among citizens who did/could not vote: There is a 0.25 difference in predicted probability to prefer the bilateral treaties over immigration control between trustful and distrustful citizens. This is exactly the same difference as that among voters who said Yes to the initiative mentioned above. In other words, trust in the Federal Council has the same effect in favor of the bilateral treaties among voters who could not or did not vote, as among those who supported the initiative.
Conclusion
The forthcoming popular vote on the new initiative launched by the Swiss People's party will be decisive. Swiss citizens will have to choose whether they want to terminate the agreement on the free movement of persons to regain control over immigration (and to limit immigration), at the risk of terminating the strategy of smooth integration in the EU; or whether they want to develop further the bilateral treatieswith additional integration agreements and possibly with a broad framework institutional agreementat the price of surrendering Switzerland's control over immigration.
The analysis of (pooled) survey data helps to figure out how the Swiss will decide and, more importantly, who will decide how. The fact that the results are fairly stable across three surveys, carried out in three different years and with two distinct survey modes, increases the confidence in the findings. On the aggregate level, the results show a clear preference for the continuation of the bilateral treaties over immigration control in the Swiss public. On the individual level, the results highlight the influence of several variables on the choice between immigration control and bilateral treaties. In addition, some of these variables influence attitudes both directly and indirectly, that is, depending on whether voters accepted or rejected the "Stop mass immigration" initiative. As mentioned in the introduction, citizens who supported the initiative but would nevertheless give priority to the continuation of the bilateral treaties will play a decisive role in the forthcoming direct democratic vote. The analysis has helped to uncover the socio-demographic and political characteristics of those pivotal voters.
Age is a first critical factor to distinguish, among voters who said Yes to the initiative, those who would continue supporting immigration control from those who would favor the bilateral agreements, should they choose between the two goals. As it turns out, young Yes voters appear more intransigent in their support to immigration control than old Yes voters, possibly because the latter are more aware of the economic importance of the bilateral treaties.
Second, voters who trust the government are more likely to favor the bilateral treaties rather than to favor limiting immigration. The vote decision on the initiative against mass immigration moderates further the effect of government trust. More specifically, voters who supported the initiative are far more likely to favor bilateral agreements over immigration control if they trust the Federal Council. A similar effect of government trust also holds for voters who did not or could not vote. Even among voters who rejected the initiative trust in government increases (slightly) the support to the bilateral treaties. These results underline the important role of the Federal Council, whose unity, credibility and leadership may play a central role in the forthcoming vote.
Third, regardless of how they voted on the initiative against mass immigration, right-wing voters are more in favor of immigration control than left-wing voters. This result is not surprising, but suggests that an erosion of the left campe.g. prompted by the re-opening of the talks regarding flanking measures in the labor marketwould be detrimental to the continuation of the bilateral treaties. Political values with respect to Swiss traditions show a similar pattern as left-right orientation. Among both respondents who supported and rejected the initiative "Stop mass immigration", the likelihood to support bilateral treaties decreases with support to Swiss traditions. Finally, support to the bilateral treaties increases with political interest among citizens who rejected the initiative, whereas political interest has ambiguous effects among citizens who accepted the initiative, meaning that this effect varies across surveys.
While the results show that Swiss voters are predisposed to support the Federal Council's bilateral strategy, they must of course be taken with a grain of salt, since the prospective question on which they rely is exactly thatprospective. While the choice offered to survey respondents is very similar to the one Swiss citizens will face when voting on the new initiative launched by the Swiss People's Party, public debate has not begun yet. Moreover, opinion formation and the outcome of the referendum will also depend on how immigration records evolve. Immigration records, in turn, will be influenced by the speed of economic recovery among EU countries.
